

the savvy to game the process, since the company it is harming may be its competitor in long distance and other areas

The consumer would be the ultimate loser in this system of rampant gaming. Local rates would have to go up to cover the lost universal service support. If local rates can't be increased, then the facilities based carrier would have no incentive to invest in the infrastructure. Service quality would likely deteriorate. Potential facilities based competitors would have no incentive to enter. Under this scenario, there are many losers, including the incumbent LEC, potential competitors and the consumer. Only the game player wins.

Since bidding is a totally unworkable means of funding universal service, it would be misleading and fruitless to speculate and attempt to respond to the specific questions in this section.

Benchmark Cost Model (BCM)

56 How do the book costs of incumbent local exchange carriers compare with the calculated proxy costs of the Benchmark Cost Model (BCM) for the same areas?

Since the Benchmark Cost Model was significantly revised, BellSouth will provide an analysis in its August 9 comments.

57. Should the BCM be modified to include non-wireline services? If wireless technology proves less costly than wireline facilities, should projected costs be capped at the level predicted for use of wireless technology?

No. Until such time as a wireless service provider becomes an "eligible carrier," there is no need to include wireless technology (except for wireless technology that is available to incumbent local exchange companies for service in very remote areas).

58. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using a wire center instead of a Census Block Group as the appropriate geographic area in projecting costs?

If actual embedded costs are used to calculate universal service support, then the wire center is the most appropriate size area for calculating support, because it represents the smallest area for which embedded costs are available. If, however, a proxy cost model is used, then costs could be calculated in an even more targeted manner. Either census block groups (as used within the Benchmark Cost Model) or grid cells (as used in the Cost Proxy Model) are superior to wire centers for targeting high cost support under a proxy cost methodology.

59. The Maine PUC and several other state commissions proposed inclusion in the BCM of the costs of connecting exchanges to the public switched network through the use of microwave, trunk, or satellite technologies. Those commenters also proposed the use of an additional extra-high-cost variable for remote areas not accessible by road. What is the feasibility and the advisability of incorporating these changes into the BCM?

BellSouth has no information regarding the feasibility of incorporating these technologies.

60. The National Cable Television Association proposed a number of modifications to the BCM related to switching cost, fill factors, digital loop carrier subscriber equipment, penetration assumptions, deployment of fiber versus copper technology assumptions, and service area interface costs. Which, if any, of these changes would be feasible and advisable to incorporate into the BCM?

In their May 7, 1996 Reply Comments in this docket, US West fully addressed the modifications proposed by the National Cable Television Association and soundly refuted the proposed changes.

None of the NCTA's proposals should be adopted. Even a summary review of the Ex Parte presentation given to the Joint Board Staff by representatives of ETI and the National Cable Television Association on May 30, 1996 (Copies of which were filed some three weeks later (June 20, 1996) with the FCC) reveals ill-conceived notions that call into question the entirety of these recommendations.

For example, ETI recommends that the fill factors for feeder and distribution cable be raised to levels of 95% in all areas. It makes this recommendation based on the following reasoning: "single line basic residential service, thus stable demand, thus high fill factor."

ETI's recommendation reflects an ignorance of network operations, in particular, the manner in which copper cable plant is maintained and/or of engineering practices designed to minimize overall levels of expenditures in providing basic service. If plant were maintained at an average fill level of 95%, there would be very few if any spare pairs available for use by maintenance crews. Thus, when a customer's service is impaired (for example, by water intrusion into the cable), there would be very limited options for getting that customer back into service. The lack of options would often times result in considerable extra expense in getting customers

back into service. Thus, when a cable's fill factor exceeds a certain point, maintenance costs go up exponentially. A fill factor of 95% certainly exceeds any reasonable level from a cable maintenance standpoint. In addition to higher maintenance costs, an average fill factor of 95% would mean that many customers who request basic service could not get it when they want it. They would have to wait for new cable to be installed. This would occur due to the very few spare pairs that on average would be available to installation crews.

A fill factor of 95% is also unrealistic in situations where some of the residents own second homes. In these areas, there will often be low utilization levels caused by residents disconnecting phone service in their primary home while they occupy their second homes. Cable fill factors will fluctuate considerably in these areas.

Lastly, the ETI's fill factor recommendation is at odds with other recommendations it advocates. For example, ETI notes that residential service should benefit from economies of scale and scope from business lines. While such a recommendation has some merit, it also means that demand will be less stable, thereby resulting in the need for an even lower utilization factor.

ETI has not provided any valid reasons for increasing utilization levels beyond those specified in the BCM. Indeed, all they have done is point out the danger in basing universal service support purely on the results of a proxy model. If the inputs are flawed (such as the 95% fill factor recommended by ETI), then universal service support will be insufficient (which clearly violates one of the principles of the Telecommunications Act of 1996).

ETI also recommends that the fixed cost of the switch be totally ignored in the cost calculation for universal service. Such a recommendation would shift, in its entirety, the recovery of this considerable cost, which is part of the cost of providing universal service, to other highly

competitive services. Such a recommendation is contrary to the universal service principles set forth in the Telecommunication Act.

Another area where ETI makes an obviously flawed recommendation is in the area of the fiber/copper crossover point. ETI recommends that a crossover point of 27kf be used rather than the 12kf used within the BCM. ETI's recommendation is largely driven by their fatally flawed recommendation to increase the copper cable utilization level to 95%. (Since they increase the utilization of copper cable by a larger relative amount than they increase the utilization level for fiber equipment, it increases the viability of copper cable.) It is also doubtful that ETI properly accounted for the increase in maintenance costs that would arise from greater reliance on copper cable technology.

Hence, it is clear that ETI's recommendations should be disregarded.

61 Should the support calculated using the Benchmark Cost Model also reflect subscriber income levels, as suggested by the Puerto Rico Telephone Company in its comments?

The proxy cost by area will not be impacted by subscriber income levels. However, as was noted in response to question 3, it may make sense to vary the affordability benchmark rate by state based on the average income level within the state.

- 62 The BCM appears to compare unseparated costs, calculated using a proxy methodology, with a nationwide local benchmark rate. Does use of the BCM suggest that the costs calculated by the model would be recovered only through services included in the benchmark rate? Does the BCM require changes to existing separations and access charge rules? Is the model designed to change as those rules are changed? Does the comparison of model costs with a local rate affordability benchmark create an opportunity for over-recovery from universal service support mechanisms?

The BCM calculates unseparated proxy costs. Once an initial level of support is calculated, each LEC would be required to reduce rates to offset the net amount of support received. (See response to question #3 for a prioritization of rate reductions). It is BellSouth's belief that no separations rule changes would be needed to implement a funding mechanism based on the BCM.

The costs calculated by the model would not be recovered solely by the core services. Indeed, the whole purpose of the universal service fund is to keep the rates for the core services at an affordable level, even when the costs of service are high. Thus, recovery of the estimated proxy costs would occur through a combination of the end user rates for the core services and the universal service fund. To the extent a company's actual costs exceed the theoretical proxy costs, then the opportunity for recovery of actual costs would need to be allowed via other rates.

If the new universal service fund is implemented in a revenue neutral manner, then the opportunity for over-recovery from universal service support mechanisms is virtually nil. However, if proxy costs are mistakenly used as actual costs, then some companies could actually end up with more support than they need, while other companies receive less support than they require. That is why revenue neutral implementation is so important. Inaccuracy within the proxy

model is rendered moot by implementation of the universal service fund in a revenue neutral manner.

63. Is it feasible and/or advisable to integrate the grid cell structure used in the Cost Proxy Model (CPM) proposed by Pacific Telesis into the BCM for identifying terrain and population in areas where population density is low?

It is BellSouth's understanding that the CPM while it calculates cost by grid cell, actually looks at terrain on a census block group basis (since that is the lowest level for which terrain data is available)

While the grid cell approach is a reasonable way to account for population in sparsely populated areas, the BCM 2 also incorporates a new and improved way to account for the geographic dispersion of people in very sparsely areas. It only considers the area within 500 feet of roads for purposes of calculating the served area in sparsely populated CBGs. Such an approach addresses a concern raised by BellSouth in earlier comment cycles.

Cost Proxy Model (CPM)

64. Can the grid cell structure used in the CPM reasonably identify population distribution in sparsely-populated areas?

It is BellSouth's understanding that census blocks (not census block groups) are used to determine where the population resides within a grid cell (or within a sparsely populated area consisting of several grid cells). Census blocks consist of about 10-20 homes on average, and thus the targeting should be quite good on average.

65 Can the CPM be modified to identify terrain and soil type by grid cell?

It is BellSouth's understanding that terrain and soil type by grid cell are actually based on data by census block group (typically, a census block group is larger than a grid cell). While not perfect, it must be remembered that the output of the models is only to be used for calculating federal universal service support. Again, if the fund is implemented on a revenue neutral basis, the model does not need to be 100% accurate (indeed, no proxy model can be 100% accurate; there will always be some deviation from reasonable actual costs).

66 Can the CPM be used on a nationwide basis to estimate the cost of providing basic residential service?

If the question is asking about the development of a nationwide average cost of providing basic residential service, BellSouth sees little value in such a calculation. However, if the question is asking about the applicability of the Cost Proxy Model in all parts of the United States, BellSouth is unaware of any obstacles to using the model in all areas. Of course, the developers of the model, Pacific Bell and NDETEC, would be in the best position to address this question in detail.

67 Using the CPM, what costs would be calculated by Census Block Group and by wire center for serving a rural, high-cost state (e.g., Arkansas)?

BellSouth is still in the process of evaluating the Cost Proxy Model. If the data can be processed, BellSouth will respond to this question when it files its comments on August 9, 1996, regarding the various cost models.

68 Is the CPM a self-contained model, or does it rely on other models, and if so, to what extent?

It is BellSouth's belief that the CPM is a self contained model. It does require switching cost inputs, however, and those may need to be calculated on a per minute basis outside of the formal CPM for use within the model.

SLC/CCLC

69 If a portion of the CCL charge represents a subsidy to support universal service, what is the total amount of the subsidy? Please provide supporting evidence to substantiate such estimates. Supporting evidence should indicate the cost methodology used to estimate the magnitude of the subsidy (e.g., long-run incremental, short-run incremental, fully-distributed)

Based on actual ARMI data, BellSouth has shown that the entire interstate CCL charge (and the interconnection charge for that matter) is a subsidy to support universal service. This showing was provided to Commission in an ex parte presentation on June 21, 1996.

70 If a portion of the CCL charge represents a contribution to the recovery of loop costs, please identify and discuss alternatives to the CCL charge for recovery of those costs from all interstate telecommunications service providers (e.g., bulk billing, flat rate/per-line charge).

If the Commission adopts a methodology that results in universal service support that is less than the current CCL, then local exchange companies need to have the flexibility to recover the remaining CCL amount in a method other than per minute charges. Bulk billing and/or flat rate per line charges would be appropriate alternatives for the Commission to implement. Below, BellSouth discusses two alternatives, bulk billing and a per line charge.

1. Bulk Billing

Under this approach, the CCL and RIC charges would be replaced by a non-usage sensitive charge billed to interexchange carriers. The charge would be initially set to produce the same level of revenue that the current CCL and RIC charges produce. Each interexchange carrier would be apportioned a part of the total amount. This apportionment would reflect the interexchange carrier's bulk billed amount. The bulk billed amount would be divided by 12, and billed monthly to the interexchange carrier. The interexchange carriers apportionment could be based on their share of

- Interstate retail revenues.
- presubscribed end user lines.
- minutes of use.

2. Per Line Charges

Under this approach, CCL and RIC charges would be replaced by a flat-rate charge per line assessed on each interexchange carrier for each line presubscribed to the interexchange carrier. The per line charge would be calculated by dividing the sum of CCL and RIC revenues by the number of projected end user access lines. A recurring charge would then be established and applied to Interexchange carriers for each line presubscribed to the interexchange carrier. The charge would be adjusted each year as a result of price cap index changes. However, no further adjustments are necessary since the amount an interexchange carrier is charged is directly related to the lines presubscribed to the interexchange carrier.

Low-Income Consumers

- 71 Should the new universal service fund provide support for the Lifeline and Linkup programs, in order to make those subsidies technologically and competitively neutral? If so, should the amount of the lifeline subsidy still be tied, as it is now, to the amount of the subscriber line charge?

BellSouth has supported including a low income support element as part of the new universal service fund. In order to implement the new program as simply as possible, the Lifeline subsidy should continue to be tied to the amount of the subscriber line charge. That way, if the Joint Board decides to implement modest SLC increases on a gradual basis, low income consumers will see no increase in the amount they pay for the SLC component of service.

Administration of Universal Service Support

- 72 Section 254(d) of the 1996 Act provides that the Commission may exempt carriers from contributing to the support of universal service if their contribution would be "de minimis." The conference report indicates that "[t]he conferees intend that this authority would only be used in cases where the administrative cost of collecting contributions from a carrier or carriers would exceed the contribution that carrier would otherwise have to make under the formula for contributions selected by the Commission." What levels of administrative costs should be expected per carrier under the various methods that have been proposed for funding (e.g., gross revenues, revenues net of payments to other carriers, retail revenues, etc.)?

BellSouth has no detailed data regarding administrative costs for each of the options listed. Intuitively, it would appear to be less administratively burdensome (and hence less costly) to calculate each company's assessment under a retail revenue approach as opposed to a value


added tax approach. The use of gross revenues would also be administratively simple, but it would suffer from the flaw of assessing access revenues twice.

Respectfully submitted,

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
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APPENDIX 1


Example A



Example A:

In this scenario, funding is provided out of the federal universal service fund for the difference between the proxy cost and the affordability benchmark rate. The state is responsible for funding the difference between the affordability benchmark rate and the actual rate. It should accomplish this by establishing an intrastate universal service fund.


Example B



Example B:

In this scenario, the affordability benchmark rate is above the proxy cost. Therefore, no funding out of the federal support mechanism is required. The state is responsible for funding the difference between the cost generated by the proxy model and the actual rate. This should be accomplished via an intrastate universal service fund.


Example C



Example C:

In this scenario, which will probably be rare, the state has a rate that is actually above the affordability benchmark rate (ABR). The state should then have a choice. It can lower its rate to the affordability benchmark rate and receive federal support for the difference between the proxy cost and the affordability benchmark rate. Or, it can leave local rates where they are and receive federal support for the difference between the actual rate and the proxy cost. The state may choose this latter alternative if it believes local conditions justify a rate higher than is produced by the affordability benchmark rate calculations (which do not take into account local conditions). Under either approach, there would be no need for intrastate universal service support.

Example D




Example D:

In this scenario, the proxy cost is below both the affordability benchmark rate and the actual rate. As such, no universal service support is required out of the federal fund or the state fund.

If the proxy cost is truly indicative of actual costs, then competition will drive down the actual rate towards the proxy cost.

Note: The above outcome would also occur when the actual rate is higher than the affordability benchmark rate, and both are higher than the proxy cost.

Example E




Example E:

In this scenario, the actual rate is above both the proxy cost and the affordability benchmark rate. If the state chooses to do so, it could lower its rate to the affordability benchmark rate (ABR) and receive support out of the federal fund for the difference between the proxy cost and the ABR. Or, it could leave rates where they are and receive no federal support. As in example D, if the proxy cost is truly indicative of actual costs, then competition will drive down the actual rate towards the proxy cost.

In any event, there is no need for an intrastate fund in this scenario.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this 2nd day of August, 1996 served all parties to this action with a copy of the foregoing FURTHER COMMENTS by placing a true and correct copy of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the parties on the attached service list.


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